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There is a current debate over the pos-
sibility and validity of synesthesia train-
ing experiments (Deroy and Spence, 2013;
Rothen and Meier, 2014). In order to test
whether a trainee should be considered to
have acquired a trained form of synesthe-
sia, a precise definition and specific diag-
nostic criteria of synesthesia are necessary.
There is currently not one specific check-
list available including all specific diag-
nostic methods and criteria, exacerbating
the determination and interpretation of
differences between (potentially) trained
and genuine synesthesia. In order to facil-
itate communication surrounding these
issues, we propose a practical guideline
for diagnosing the specific characteristics
that are typical of grapheme-color synesthe-
sia (GCS). These guidelines can be applied
to developmental cases of GCS, cases of
trainees who may show synesthetic traits,
and other types of acquired forms of GCS
at the level of a single individual.
Researchers have tried to train synes-
thesia since at least 1934 (Kelly, 1934),
and several studies have been done in
recent years (for reviews see: Deroy and
Spence, 2013; Rothen and Meier, 2014).
Leaving trained, acquired, or induced
types of synesthesia aside, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge the extent of inter-
individual differences between synesthetes
(even within one sub-type), making a
generally accepted definition difficult to
reach. For example, an individual may
report that letters automatically induced
the conscious experience of color since
childhood, however, these colors may not
be consistently mapped to each letter.
Such an individual would fail the “test of
genuineness,” while he or she may still
meet the other defining characteristics of
synesthesia, such as the conscious expe-
rience of color in the absence of phys-
ical color. This is one example of why
the definition of developmental synesthesia
is a topic of active debate in the litera-
ture (Cohen Kadosh and Terhune, 2012;
Eagleman, 2012; Simner, 2012). The need
for a consensus on the specific defining
characteristics of synesthesia becomes only
more prominent when trying to compare
trainees to synesthetes.
Characteristics of GCS at the individ-
ual vs. group level must be distinguished.
Group-level effects related to synesthesia
cannot (yet) be used as diagnostic tools.
If two groups differ relatively from each
other on a certain score or measurement,
this does not tell us at an absolute level
whether “score X on task A” or “mea-
surement Y in trait B” of an individ-
ual implies that he or she is necessarily
a synesthete. The nature of such studies
does not allow one to assume that a cer-
tain measurement is unique to synesthe-
sia. For example, it has been shown that
GCS is associated with increased structural
connectivity compared to controls in the
temporal cortex at the group-level (Rouw
and Scholte, 2007). However, the absolute
value measured for white-matter connec-
tivity in a particular individual could be
influenced by different unknown causes.
Although measurements can made at the
individual level (see Table 1), experiments
designed to test group-level characteris-
tics related to GCS by definition cannot
be used as diagnostic criteria, such as
memory benefits (Yaro and Ward, 2007;
Rothen and Meier, 2010; Rothen et al.,
2012; Pritchard et al., 2013; Terhune et al.,
2013), differences in visual processing
(Terhune et al., 2011; Brang et al., 2012;
Banissy et al., 2013), the reported vivid-
ness of visual mental imagery (Barnett
and Newell, 2008), distinct cognitive styles
(Meier and Rothen, 2013) or differences
in neuroanatomy (for a review see: Rouw
et al., 2011). Similarly, idiosyncrasy (the
fact that grapheme-color mappings differ
between individuals) cannot be used as a
marker at the individual level; if two synes-
thetes have nearly identical mappings, they
are not excluded from being considered
synesthetes (Witthoft andWinawer, 2013).
Additionally, the low prevalence of synes-
thesia is a group-level characteristic that
is not diagnostic at the individual level.
Most neurobiological markers related to
GCS (Rouw et al., 2011) and the presence
of certain genetic markers (Asher et al.,
2009; Tomson et al., 2011) are related to
the group-level. Individual-level traits are
sometimes confused with inclusive crite-
ria for GCS. For example, GCS tends to
be unidirectional at a conscious level (i.e.,
graphemes elicit color experiences, but
color experiences do not elicit conscious
grapheme experiences) and bidirectional
at an unconscious level (Knoch et al., 2005;
Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006; Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2007; Gebuis et al., 2009;
Weiss et al., 2009; Rothen et al., 2010).
Still, an instance of conscious bidirectional
GCS does not exclude an individual from
being considered a synesthete when the
other defining characteristics are met (e.g.,
Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007).
Diagnosing synesthesia in a sin-
gle individual is based on a variety of
characteristics. Concerning diagnosing
“trained” forms of synesthesia, Rothen
and Meier (2014) state: “Hence, to con-
firm the hypothesis, that synesthesia can
be induced via training, would require
the trained inducers to (i) consistently
and (ii) automatically elicit (iii) the associ-
ated concurrent experiencewith perceptual
qualities on a subjective phenomenologi-
cal basis (iv) for the great majority of the
inducers’ occurrences (v) over an extended
time period” (italics are the authors’ own).
We propose to extend their definition with
a diagnostic criteria checklist.
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Table 1 | Proposed diagnostic criteria for grapheme-color synesthesia at the level of a single individual.
Dimension Method Criteria Remarks
Major axis
grapheme-color
synesthesia
Consistent Percentage within a
duration: Test–retest
paradigm using the
Cambridge Synesthesia
Charts (TOG:
(Baron-Cohen et al.,
1987); TOG-R: Asher
et al., 2006)
Percentage within a duration:
70–100% after at least 3 months
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Asher
et al., 2006)
We suggest that especially for trained or acquired
forms of synesthesia that the online color-picker
consistency tests be repeated with more than 3
months in between testing sessions in order to
exclude possible memory strategies that could be
facilitated by training or temporary mental states
such as can be induced under hypnosis. We note
that there is open discussion on the criteria of
consistency in the field (Cohen Kadosh and
Terhune, 2012; Eagleman, 2012; Simner, 2012)
Color-distance level:
Online color pickers
(Eagleman et al., 2007;
Rothen et al., 2013a)
Color-distance level: Cut-off at 135
in CIELUV color space (Eagleman
et al., 2007; Rothen et al., 2013a)
The Eagleman et al. (2007) test for consistency is
completed within a single testing session, and the
original criteria in RGB space (cut-off at 1) is also an
acceptable level of consistency, although it has
been shown to be too conservative (Rothen et al.,
2013a). Euclidean distance in CIELUV color space
was shown to have the best discriminatory power,
because this space is perceptually uniform (Rothen
et al., 2013a). Conversion software may be
downloaded here:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/synesthesia/links
Automatic Synesthetic Stroop test Using a within-subjects design, a
significant difference in
performance for incongruent
compared to congruent stimuli
should be found (Wollen and
Ruggiero, 1983; Mills, 1999;
Odgaard et al., 1999; Dixon et al.,
2000; Smilek et al., 2001). For
interpretation of
synesthesia-related behavior, it is
important to include a
within-subject baseline measure,
such as digit or letter naming in
addition to (synesthetic) color
naming (Mills, 1999), and
especially when the case cannot
be compared to a group of
matched controls
Automaticity refers to the involuntary nature of the
experience of the synesthetic concurrent, which
elicits interference with task demands. It is
important to note that the presence of a Stroop
effect does not necessarily imply that the
association is at a perceptual level
Conditioned response A conditioned response to the
unconditioned grapheme stimulus
should be found after the
corresponding color of the
grapheme, but should not be
present in a control condition or
group (Meier and Rothen, 2007;
Rothen et al., 2010)
It has been argued that the synesthetic
conditioned-response effect may alternatively
reflect the conscious experience instead of the
automatic nature of the synesthetic color, because
it is only present in developmental synesthetes
and not trainees who show reliable Stroop effects
(Meier and Rothen, 2007, 2009; Rothen et al.,
2010)
Pupil diameter The average pupil diameter
measured when viewing
incongruent graphemes is
significantly larger compared to
viewing congruent and black
graphemes (Paulsen and Laeng,
2006)
Pupil diameter is a physiological measure of the
autonomic nervous system (e.g., Weiskrantz,
1998). Reliable differences related to synesthetic
congruency in pupil diameter were found at the
individual and group levels (Paulsen and Laeng,
2006) It remains to be shown whether this
difference in pupil diameter can be used as an
index of conscious vs. unconscious processes
related to grapheme-color synesthesia
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Dimension Method Criteria Remarks
Validated questionnaire:
CLaN (Rothen et al.,
2013b)
A score >3 on questions
pertaining to the automaticity of
colors (note that some questions
need to be reversed for the final
scoring; Rothen et al., 2013b)
The degree of automaticity can vary between
synesthetes and was shown to be correlated with
levels of interference in a synesthetic-color naming
Stroop task (Rothen et al., 2013b). The CLaN
questionnaire can be downloaded here:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/synaesthesia/links
Conscious Interview/questionnaires The individual should report
conscious experiences of color at
a perceptual level
An example questionnaire designed for
trainees can be found in Colizoli et al. (2012);
Colizoli et al. (2014). We follow Rothen and Meier
(2014) that if an individual reports knowing that the
letter has a color, but does not report a
phenomenological experience of the color itself,
this individual should not be considered to be a
synesthete
Perceptual Crowding (Hubbard et al.,
2005), Visual-Search
(Palmeri et al., 2002),
Opponent Color Effects
(Nikolic´ et al., 2007),
Binocularly Defined
Stimuli (Palmeri et al.,
2002; Kim et al., 2006),
Motion-Defined Stimuli
(Palmeri et al., 2002; Kim
et al., 2006)
The individual should show
significant low-level perceptual
effects of color, in the absence of
physical color. Evidence for the
presence of perceptual effects of
synesthesia in an individual is
strongest when a group of
matched controls does not show
the effects tested
Due to the individual differences within
synesthesia, it is not always the case that every
“synesthete” will show significant low-level
perceptual effects of color. For example, it was
believed that grapheme-color synesthesia
involved pre-attentive pop-out of color in the
presence of inducing graphemes, however, this
has been shown not to be the case for all
synesthetes tested (e.g., Hubbard et al., 2005;
Rothen and Meier, 2009; Ward et al., 2010; Rich
and Karstoft, 2013)
Case vs. control
neuroimaging study
(Elias et al., 2003; Steven
et al., 2006)
The individual (case) but not the
control group, should show
differential neural activation or
patterns of activation related to
the concurrent sense when only
the inducing sense is triggered.
The control group should not
show activation related to the
concurrent sense when the
inducing sense is triggered
We note that within grapheme-color synesthesia,
dissociating the inducer (grapheme) and
concurrent (color) modalities is challenging due to
their physical proximity in the brain and the fact
that both modalities are in the visual sense. For
this reason, it is not always clear whether color
activation is reliably found in the presence of
inducing black graphemes (Rouw et al., 2011).
Using auditory linguistic stimuli in contrast to visual
stimuli may help to dissociate brain activation
related to the inducer vs. the concurrent sense in
grapheme-color synesthesia (given that the
auditory mode elicits the visual synesthetic
experience)
Bandwidth Inducer-Bandwidth:
# Inducers/# Possible
Inducers (Asher et al.,
2006; Rothen and Meier,
2013);
Concurrent-Bandwidth:
# Concurrents/# Possible
Concurrents
Inducer-Bandwidth: > 5 inducers
for 36 letters and numbers; (e.g.,
Rothen et al., 2013a);
Concurrent-Bandwidth: > 5
concurrents for 36 letters and
numbers
We are in favor of using this low cut-off for the
Inducer-Bandwidth, as it would include
synesthetes who experience only vowels and/or
numerals as having synesthetic colors. By
definition, trainees with only four letter-color
mappings would be excluded. The relationship
between Inducer- and Concurrent-Bandwidth is
unclear. We feel that Concurrent-Bandwidth should
be addressed directly in future research in order to
reach a consensus on the criterion. Using color
charts can help differentiate, for example, whether
two “reds” are actually the same color or only
have the same category name
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Dimension Method Criteria Remarks
Not
“perceptually
present”
Question the participant The individual should not consider
synesthetic concurrents to be “in
the world” in the same way as
the experience of the inducer
(Rouw et al., 2013; Rouw and
Ridderinkhof, 2014; Seth, 2014),
although they do often feel as
though they belong to the
inducer. Synesthetic concurrent
experiences are not confused
with hallucinations, which are
more complex, irregular, and
unpredictable (Cytowic, 2002;
Sagiv et al., 2011)
This does not exclude the possibility that the
knowledge about the relationship of synesthetic
concurrents to features of the real or external
world may be learned, however, synesthetes do
not consider their concurrent experiences to feel
like hallucinations even though they do commonly
describe them as real or an integral part of the
experience. Importantly, visual hallucinations
replace the visual field in which they “exist” rather
than superimposing themselves or co-existing with
the veridical percepts (Cytowic, 2002)
Above criteria
is not fake,
made up, or
due to “the
expectancy
effect”
The experimental goals
should be kept as
discrete as possible.
Experimenters should be
blind to the subject
groups and true purpose
of the experiment
whenever possible. After
testing, ask participants
to openly report possible
strategy use and their
interpretation of the
experiment
Prevented and verified post-hoc:
Effects found in the other
dimensions listed above should
not be due to the participants
consciously or unconsciously
fulfilling the expectations of the
experimenter. Exclude
participants who admit to
pretending to have subjective
traits or trying to adjust their
behavior in an unnatural way in
accordance with what they
believe the desired experimental
goals are
We note that in practice, this is challenging to
completely exclude, however, it is an important
concern that we feel needs to be addressed
Major axis
developmental
grapheme-color
synesthesia
Early age of
onset
Question the participant
(include family members
and friends of the family
if possible)
The synesthetic experiences have
been or are reported to have been
present since early childhood (age
3–10) or as far back as the
individual can remember
(Cytowic, 2002)
Developmental synesthetes can often report the
first time they realized their experiences were
different from the experiences of others
Longitudinal research
(Simner and Bain, 2013)
A developmental synesthete will
show higher levels of consistency
(compared to controls of the
same demographic group)
beginning in childhood and
continuing into adulthood (Simner
and Bain, 2013)
The percentage of fixed grapheme-color
associations has been shown to increase with age
(Simner et al., 2009; Simner and Bain, 2013)
Not caused by
pathology
Family history, medical
records, questionnaires
(e.g., Baron-Cohen and
Harrison, 1997; Cytowic,
2002)
No history of disease, drug use,
pathology or neuropathology
If synesthetic behavior and experiences persist
following brain damage or drug use, then an
individual may be considered to have acquired
synesthesia, but not developmental synesthesia. It
is not clear whether cases that may co-occur with
psychological and cognitive phenomenon such as
autism, schizophrenia, or other pathologies such as
multiple sclerosis share the same underlying
neuro-developmental trajectory as developmental
synesthesia
Methods, criteria, and references (when available) are listed for testing the necessary dimensions related to diagnosing synesthesia along the major axes: grapheme-
color synesthesia (seven dimensions) and developmental grapheme-color synesthesia (nine dimensions). Some of the dimensions have multiple methodologies for
testing the criteria. More research is needed to test whether different methodologies used within one dimension provide corresponding results. We propose at
least one criterion per dimension should be met for an individual to be considered to have grapheme-color synesthesia.
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We propose a guideline for diagnos-
ing GCS based on dimensions along major
axes for GCS (Table 1). Such a check-
list can aid in the diagnosis of GCS
(whether trained, acquired or develop-
mental in nature). In this checklist, we
present methods, criteria and references
for the measurement of each dimension
whenever possible. We propose that the
presence of at least one result within each
of the dimensions in Table 1 to be the nec-
essary criteria for a diagnosis of GCS at the
individual level. Several dimensions have
multiple methodologies for testing the cri-
teria. An important question that cannot
yet be answered is whether the different
methodologies give congruent patterns of
results. For example, do individuals who
report having stronger perceptual experi-
ences also show larger perceptual crowding
effects? Such issues are particularly rele-
vant when testing trainees, where differ-
ences between measurements may emerge,
such as the presence of a Stroop effect
in the absence of conditioned response
(Rothen and Meier, 2009).
The Consistent nature of the map-
pings involves the Percentage of mappings
that do not change over a Duration of
time (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1987;
Asher et al., 2006), or the Level of con-
sistency as measured in color distance
between repetitions of identical trials of a
test (Eagleman et al., 2007; Rothen et al.,
2013a). Although the consistency criterion
is debated, the percentage and duration of
consistency have traditionally been con-
sidered the “test of genuineness,” because
of the inability of control participants to
perform at the same level as synesthetes
when all task demands are in their favor
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Asher
et al., 2006). If the presence of synesthesia-
like behavior or experience is temporary
(e.g., drug use or hypnosis), the indi-
vidual will be excluded over time by the
consistency criterion.
The Automatic nature of synesthesia
refers to the involuntary nature of the
experience; it cannot willfully be “turned
on or off.” (This involuntary nature does
not necessarily imply that GCS is pre-
attentional or unconsciously evoked, e.g.,
see Mattingley, 2009). Automaticity can be
verified in behavior, with the commonly
used “synesthetic Stroop task,” (Wollen
and Ruggiero, 1983) or with a validated
questionnaire (Rothen et al., 2013b),
and in physiology as measured with
pupil diameter (Paulsen and Laeng, 2006)
or a color-sound conditioning paradigm
(Meier and Rothen, 2009).
The Conscious nature of the experi-
ence of a percept in the absence of its
external stimulation is perhaps the hall-
mark of synesthesia. Perception can be
conscious or unconscious in neurobiolog-
ical terms (e.g., Lamme and Roelfsema,
2000). Verifying the conscious percep-
tion of a synesthetic experience is typ-
ically the starting point of recruiting
synesthetes to participate in a study.
Synesthetic experiences are verified to be
conscious by interview with the individual.
Conscious experiences have been found
related to consistent experiences (Simner
et al., 2006). Trainees can be assessed
with specifically designed questionnaires
(Colizoli et al., 2012, 2014).
The Perceptual nature of the synes-
thetic experience can be objectively
verified by using a variety of psychophys-
ical visual tasks (e.g., Palmeri et al., 2002;
Hubbard et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2006;
Nikolic´ et al., 2007). Confirmatory find-
ings where obtained with neuroimaging
techniques (e.g., Nunn et al., 2002; Elias
et al., 2003; Steven et al., 2006). Not all
sub-types of synesthetes consistently show
perceptual effects of synesthetic color
when measured objectively (e.g., Hubbard
et al., 2005; Rothen and Meier, 2009; Ward
et al., 2010; Rich and Karstoft, 2013), and
this is a point of discussion in diagnosing
GCS (Rothen and Meier, 2014).
Bandwidth refers to the extent of
the mappings between modalities and
this variability leads to the idiosyncratic
nature of GCS at the group level (Asher
et al., 2006; Rothen and Meier, 2013).
Inducer-Bandwidth refers to the propor-
tion of synesthetic inducers compared
to the number of possible inducers.
Concurrent-Bandwidth, which has received
relatively less attention in the field, refers
to the proportion of synesthetic concur-
rents compared to the number of possible
concurrents.
Perceptual Presence, which is the feel-
ing that an experience is “real” in the same
way that an event or object in the outside
world is real, is characteristically lacking
for synesthetes (Rouw et al., 2013; Rouw
and Ridderinkhof, 2014; Seth, 2014). A
synesthete typically does not get confused
between sensations reflecting events in the
outside world, and sensations caused by
their synesthesia. Thus, for a synesthete,
an inducer has perceptual presence, but
the concurrent does not. This distinction
is similar to the distinction drawn between
synesthetic experiences and hallucinations
(e.g., Cytowic, 2002; Sagiv et al., 2011);
synesthetic experiences are notably sim-
pler, more regular and more predictable
than hallucinations.
Lastly, an important factor to consider
that is often neglected is the “Expectancy
Effect,” which is the reactivity on the
participants part when they behave (con-
sciously or unconsciously) in the way they
believe they are expected to behave based
on the characteristics of the study. This
is an important and possibly confound-
ing factor for any study where synesthesia
is evoked (e.g., through learning, sugges-
tion, or hypnosis). It may be the case
that participants have guessed the purpose
of training paradigms and then behave
accordingly. Therefore, none of the effects
related to “synesthesia” in the dimensions
listed in Table 1 may be caused by the
expectancy effect to be considered GCS.
Experiencing synesthesia since early
childhood would be necessary for inclu-
sion as Developmental GCS, but by
definition would not be necessary for
inclusion as trained or acquired GCS.
Developmental GCS occurs in the absence
of pathology, such as disease, drug
use or mental disorders (Baron-Cohen
and Harrison, 1997; Cytowic, 2002).
Synesthetes differ from non-synesthetes
in biological aspects such as functional
and structural brain differences and the
presence of certain genetic markers (Asher
et al., 2009; Tomson et al., 2011). As pre-
viously mentioned, two main issues make
the use of these markers unreliable for
diagnosing synesthesia at the individual
level. First, the group-level nature of such
studies does not allow for inference at the
individual level. Second, differences found
at the neural and genetic levels may arise
due to unknown causes in addition to
causes that may be unique to synesthe-
sia. Perceptual training paradigms may be
suited to probe these underlying neural
and genetic mechanisms.
Paradigms directed at training synes-
thesia can help to answer some open
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questions pertaining to the development
of synesthesia, learning and memory, such
as: Is there a critical period for the per-
ceptual development of synesthesia? As far
as we know, there are no developmen-
tal neuroimaging studies on synesthesia
or training studies in children in poten-
tial critical periods of development. The
brains of children show high levels of neu-
roplasticity, meaning high sensitivity to
forming structural changes (Schlaug et al.,
2009). It has been shown that specific
synesthetic colors stem directly from child-
hood toys (Witthoft and Winawer, 2013),
but this seems to be the exception, not
the rule (Rich et al., 2005). Understanding
the developmental pattern in synesthe-
sia will help characterize the interaction
between genes and environment in percep-
tual development.
In sum, we feel that trying to train
“synesthesia” is a win-win situation. If
GCS can be trained, we will have gained
an understanding about who is more likely
to become a synesthete and how. If GCS
cannot be trained, we will still have gained
an understanding about what the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions must be in
order to develop it. Our opinion is that
trainees should not be considered to have
acquired GCS per se unless the proposed
criteria are met and should always be con-
sidered to be distinct from developmental
synesthetes. We ask for and welcome the
expansion and improvement of this diag-
nostic checklist. A commonly used model
that can be both diagnostic and flexible is
necessary for reaching a consensus in the
field on the definition of (trained?) GCS.
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